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BOOK REVIEWS
BiLLs, NoTS Am CHEcKs. By Melville M. Bigelow. Third
Edition, by William M Lile, 1928. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.,
pp. lxix, 599.
Teachers and students of the law of negotiable instruments as
well, no doubt, as legal practitioners, have felt the lack of any up-
to-date text upon this important and difficult field of the law. The
successive editions of Professor Brannan's annotations to the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law have indeed been an invaluable aid, but
have not met the need for a comprehensive textbook treatment. The
appearance of this new edition of Professor Bigelow's well-known
work would therefore be welcome, even if it were nothing more than
a conventional annotation of the text of the second edition. For-
tunately Professor Lile has not contented himself with that. He
has realized that the uniform act and its judicial construction have
produced changes in the law so important that a new edition, to
be of value, must completely revise the existing work and introduce
much new material. The result is that, save for certain resemblanc-
es in general structure and outline, the new edition is the author's
own work, and has but little in common with the 1900 edition.
It must be said at the outset that the author has done his work
well. The new book manifests throughout a sure grasp of the legal
materials, the result of Professor Lile's long experience as a teacher
of the subject and of years of thoughtful reflection. So much new
material has been added that the new edition contains more than
double the number of chapters and pages of the old. A new chap-
ter has been added dealing with common-law instruments, afford-
ing the reader at the outset a background for contrasting negotiable
and non-negotiable instruments. The chapter on conflict of laws,
as it relates to negotiable instruments, has been dropped in this
edition. Especial emphasis has been laid upon the nature of the
indorser's contract, the concept of the holder in due course, real
(or, in the terminology of the author, absolute) defenses, the dis-
charge of the instrument, and the discharge of parties thereto.
One feels, after reading this book, that Professor Lile is over-
modest when, in the preface, he describes his style as diffuse, and
perhaps dogmatic and tutorial. He confesses that the book is
written primarily to assist students. Were it the fact, however,
that the volume were no more than a series of dogmatic lectures,
endeavoring to render simple and easy for students a subject which
at the best is technical and difficult, it would be of no great value.
The fact is that the book is written in a clear and interesting style,
and that the author has quite consistently refrained from efforts
to simplify the law at the price of giving a distorted and inaccurate
picture of it. The extensive footnotes display scholarship of a high
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order, and are certain to be of substantial value to the practitioner.
Typical of them may be cited the note discussing the effect of
Negotiable Instruments Law section 87, which deals with notes
payable at a specified bank; the note to section 228 of the text,
relative to the burden of proof of loss or no loss, where there has
been unreasonable delay in the presentment of a check; and the
note on page 150 analyzing the effect of the death of the drawer
of a check. Care has been taken to discuss the application of the
Negotiable Instruments Law to all important points, and to point
out the many defects and obscurities existing in that statute. Also
worthy of praise is the effort made by the author to cite in his notes
valuable articles in law reviews dealing wittl controversial matters.
The mechanical features of the book leave little to be desired.
It is unusually free from typographical errors. The full text of
the Negotiable Instruments Law is set forth in an appendix. The
table of contents and index are so carefully prepared as to assist
the reader rather than to annoy him by inaccuracy and incomplete-
ness. A complete table of cases is provided. The only cloud on
the picture is the failure to include dates in the citation of cases.
Criticisms to be made to Professor Lile's work are not so serious
as to detract materially from its general excellence. One wonders
why the author, in his otherwise valuable preliminary chapter on
non-negotiable securities, conveys the impression that an instru-
ment is either a negotiable mercantile specialty or else is relegated
to the position of an ordinary chose in action, by failing to point
out that many cases have recognized the existence of non-negotiable
commercial paper, having on the one hand certain characteristics
of common-law choses in action and on the other certain qualities
peculiar to negotiable paper, such as presumption of consideration.
Again, in discussing the question whether a drawer or maker owes
any duty of care to subsequent holders not to issue an instrument
otherwise complete containing blanks facilitating alteration, Pro-
fessor Lile asserts rather dogmatically that he owes no such duty,
and further that there is no sufficient ground for creating a duty.
That the case of Young v. Grote is no authority for the contrary
view, as has often been erroneously supposed, is undoubtedly true.
Moreover, the correctness of the author's statement of the state
of the authorities and the tendency of the more recent cases is not
challenged. But it is believed that his analysis does not recognize
the force of the substantial arguments which may be made for im-
posing such a duty of care, within reasonable limits, in favor of
subsequent holders. To say, as he does on page 422, that the draw-
er's negligence is not the proximate cause of the holder's loss is
either to beg the question or to restate, without justifying, the re-
sults some of the cases have reached. Too great reliance is placed
by Professor Lile upon the analogy to ordinary tort situations.
Special considerations arising out of the peculiar nature and func-
tions of negotiable paper, which might well warrant a departure
from ordinary tort doctrines in these cases, are unnoticed. One
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is grateful, however, to the author for not falling into the common
non sequitur that the recognition of a duty of care in these cases
would ipso facto compel makers and drawers of instruments to use
protectographs, chemically treated papers and other modern com-
mercial devices for the prevention of alteration.
The discussion in section 477, and note, of the question when a
bank which has credited proceeds of discount of paper is deemed
to become a purchaser for value of such paper likewise seems some-
what superficial. It is assumed without much discussion that the
rule properly applicable to these cases is the so-called rule in Clay-
ton's Case,' "first money in is first money out." That doctrine
arose originally in cases involving the application of payments as
between debtor and creditor, where the interests of innocent third
parties are not involved. It is by no means clear that the doctrine
ought to be applied to cases where it will operate to deprive a de-
frauded maker or drawer of a meritorious defense, where such ap-
plication is not necessary to protect the discounting bank from loss.
If this extension of fhe doctrine be warranted,- it is for some reasons
of practical necessity which are not pointed out by the author.
Among the cases cited in the note as supporting this rule is the
case of National Bank of Commerce v. Morgan, 208 Ala. 65, 92 So.
10. This is a miscitation, as that case contains one of the strongest
arguments which have been made against the "first money in is
first money out" rule. It may be noted in passing that the above
problem is discussed in the chapter on Notice of Equities rather
than in the chapter on Purchase for Value, where it logically be-
longs.
One other criticism of substance is that the author is not always
accurate in his use of the term "accommodation indorser." On
page 169 he seems to treat it as synonymous with irregular in-
dorser. In section 251 he would apparently apply the term only
to indorsers receiving no consideration for their indorsements.
This is, of course, inaccurate.
In fairness to Professor Lile, it must be pointed out that limita-
tions of space no doubt prevented him from discussing as fully as
he desired some of these problems, and that only minor criticisms
can be made of the actual content of his book. While it by no
means satisfies the need for a creative work which will do for the
underlying theory of the law of negotiable instruments what Dean
Wigmore's classic work has done for the law of evidence, Professor
Lile's work is a valuable addition to the all too scanty literature
on this subject. So successful has he been here in clothing an old
skeleton with new flesh that we may well indulge the hope of further
and more extensive contributions from his pen in this field.
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